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Abstract
We use the Hsiao-Granger method to test for growth-terrorism causality
for seven Western European countries. In bivariate settings, the impact of
economic performance on domestic terrorism is very strong. In trivariate
settings, the impact of performance on terrorism diminishes. Here, we
￿nd that economic performance leads terrorist violence in robust ways
only for three out of seven countries. Terrorism is almost never found to
causally in￿ uence growth in bivariate and trivariate speci￿cations. Our
￿ndings indicate that (i) the role of economic performance in determining
terrorist violence appears to have been important for some countries and
(ii) all attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to the threat
of terrorism.
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1INTRODUCTION
The question of causality between terrorism and economic performance has not
been settled. Does terrorism produce noticeable damages to aggregate perfor-
mance, does poor economic performance contribute to the generation of terror,
or do both e⁄ects exist side by side? On the one hand, the allocation and ac-
cumulation of resources may be negatively in￿ uenced by terrorism, for instance,
as investment or savings are discouraged, consequently also a⁄ecting economic
growth. On the other hand, economic factors may play an important role in ex-
plaining terrorism, for example, as low opportunity costs of violence ￿manifested
in poor economic growth ￿may foster con￿ ict.
This contribution aims to identify the links between the intensity of domestic
terrorism and the rate of real GDP per capita growth.1 We investigate this
relationship for seven Western European countries.2 All investigated countries
experienced substantial economic success in the past. Most countries grew be-
tween 2 and 4% p.a. between 1950 and 2004. Nevertheless, these countries also
su⁄ered episodes of major political violence, especially in comparison to other
countries in this part of the world. In fact, the seven selected countries accounted
for 97% of all reported terrorist attacks and 96% of all reported terror-related
fatalities from 1950 to 2004, according to the Terrorism in Western Europe:
Events Data (TWEED) dataset of Engene (2007).3 Most domestic terrorist or-
ganizations in the investigated countries were driven by leftist, ethnic-nationalist
or separatist ideologies (cf. Engene, 2007). Thus, they were potentially moti-
vated by political factors. However, terrorism cannot be sensibly explained by
one ￿ root cause￿only. With our analysis, we want to ￿nd out whether economic
performance ￿economic growth ￿also swayed the terrorists￿calculus. At the
same time, we want to analyze whether terrorism negatively a⁄ected growth.
We test for growth-terrorism Granger causality in a time-series framework. We
try to detect causality only in a statistical but not purely philosophical ￿￿ cause
and e⁄ect￿￿sense. That is, through our analysis we are able to assess whether
changes in terrorism (growth) are helpful for forecasting future changes in growth
(terrorism). Our analysis is helpful in approximating ￿ real￿causality without
implying it, so corresponding interpretations should be made carefully. In order
to investigate for Granger causality in our empirical framework, we ￿rst examine
the stationarity properties of the underlying time series through a unit root test.
At this point we are also able to identify structural breaks, that is, major changes
in the country￿ s economic or political history during the period of observation.
We then process our data in accordance with the unit root test results. When we
test for Granger causality, we rely on the Hsiao-Granger procedure to circumvent
common problems associated with detecting Granger causality in time-series
frameworks. In comparison to standard Granger causality tests, our procedure
allows for high variations in lag length selection. In order to avoid omitted
variable biases and to check for robustness, we test for causality in a bivariate and
trivariate system. By testing for Granger causality in a time-series setting, we
add to existing evidence which has mainly blanked out the question of causality
between economic performance and terrorist violence.
As our main results, we ￿nd that (i) all the investigated growth and terror series
2exhibit structural breaks that match with important turning points in the coun-
tries￿economic and political history. (ii) In bivariate systems, economic growth
leads terrorist violence in all cases, whereas terrorism causally in￿ uences growth
only in the case of Portugal. It appears as if economic performance in￿ uences
the terrorists￿calculus, yet the resiliency of attacked economies is generally high,
so terror-induced shocks do not feed through to growth. (iii) Knowing that bi-
variate causality tests are prone to inconsistencies, we also perform causality
tests in trivariate systems. The ￿ndings con￿rm that economies under attack
are successful in adjusting to the threats of terror, so growth is not impaired.
With respect to Granger causality running from growth to terrorism, the results
weaken previous ones from the bivariate analysis. Economic performance ro-
bustly sways the terrorists￿calculus only for Germany, Portugal and Spain, but
not for the rest of the sample. That is, in some countries solid growth may raise
the opportunity costs of terror, thus discouraging violent behavior, for instance
as individuals ￿nd more economic opportunities; the opposite relationship should
hold in periods of economic downturn. Policymakers should not underestimate
the role of economic factors ￿and of the opportunity costs of violence ￿in im-
pacting domestic terrorism. For some countries in Western Europe, economic
success apparently contributed to a crowding out of domestic terrorism. How-
ever, factors other than economic performance ￿for instance political instability,
demographic pressures or international politics ￿should also be considered when
explaining terrorism dynamics, in particular when growth-terrorism links are not
found to be strong.
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
discuss the academic literature on possible interactions between terrorism and
growth. In Section 3, we introduce the data and our methodology, and also
present our empirical results. In Section 4, we discuss our ￿ndings. We sum up
our results in Section 5.
CAUSAL LINKS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND
GROWTH
Potential Impact of Terrorism on Economic Growth
A central short-run goal of terrorists is economic destabilization. Terrorist ac-
tions ￿assassinations, bombings, and so forth ￿are means to achieve this short-
run goal. Long-run political objectives ￿such as a redistribution of wealth and
power ￿are to be enforced through such actions. Collier (1999) identi￿es sev-
eral channels through which civil war a⁄ects the economy; Collier￿ s ideas may
be transferred to terrorism as another form of violent con￿ ict. The channels of
transaction from con￿ ict to the economy are: destruction, disruption, diversion,
dissaving and portfolio substitution.4 Destruction refers to the direct costs of
terrorism, as human and physical capital are destroyed through terrorist strikes.
The disruption e⁄ect may for instance become manifest in higher transaction
costs, as the e⁄ectiveness of public institutions is challenged and manipulated
by terror, as insecurity in general increases, and so forth. Diversion occurs when
public resources are shifted from output-enhancing to non-productive ￿defence
3and security ￿expenditures. Dissaving refers to a decline in savings that a⁄ects
the economy￿ s capital stock. Portfolio substitution means the ￿ ight of human,
physical and ￿nancial capital from a country in the face of con￿ ict. Through all
these e⁄ects economic performance may su⁄er, in particular as they may rein-
force each other. Inter alia, Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Naor (2006) and Mirza
and Verdier (2008) provide related theoretical considerations that also discuss
how terror may act negatively on economic activity. In general, terrorism may
distort the allocation of resources, basically through the disruption, diversion
and portfolio substitution channel. It may also negatively in￿ uence resource
accumulation, mainly via the destruction and dissaving channel.
Empirical evidence indicates that terrorism adversely in￿ uences international
trade (cf. Nitsch and Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg and Hess 2006; Mirza and
Verdier, 2008).5 Its unfavorable impact on tourism is well-documented, in partic-
ular for several Mediterranean countries (cf. Enders and Sandler, 1991; Enders
et al., 1992; Drakos and Kutan, 2003). Transnational terrorism also appears to
distort domestic and foreign direct investment (cf. Enders and Sandler, 1996;
Fielding, 2003; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2008). Blomberg, Hess and Orphi-
nades (2004) furthermore ￿nd that resources are relocated from investment to
government spending in times of terrorist violence. A number of studies conse-
quently detect a substantial negative in￿ uence of terrorism on overall economic
growth (cf. Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Crain
and Crain, 2006; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2008). In general, existing evidence
con￿rms that terrorists are able to destabilize targeted economies. Here, eco-
nomic activity is a⁄ected through various channels, for instance through the
destruction of national capital stocks, the disruption of trade or tourism ￿ ows,
or the diversion of resources away from private investment, ultimately resulting
in negative growth e⁄ects.
Possible E⁄ects of Economic Performance on Terrorism
Economic theory argues that terrorists are rational individuals which choose
their levels of violent activity according to the costs and bene￿ts arising from
their actions (cf., e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004). Because of terrorists￿pre-
sumed rationality, the opportunity costs of terror also matter. Intuitively, low
opportunity costs of violence ￿that is, few prospects of economic activity ￿lead
to elevated terrorist activity, whereas high opportunity costs result in the op-
posite (cf., e.g., Freytag et al., 2008). Times of economic success mean, inter
alia, more individual economic opportunities and economic participation. Higher
levels of overall growth should coincide with higher opportunity costs of terror
and thus less violence. Conversely, in periods of economic downturn should be
accompanied by fewer economic opportunities and participation and thus by
more economic dissatisfaction. In times of economic crisis, dissidents are more
likely to resort to violence as the opportunity costs of terror are low, while the
potential long-run payo⁄s from violence ￿a redistribution of scarce economic
resources which is to be enforced by means of terrorism ￿ are comparatively
high (cf. Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004).
To some extent, empirical evidence suggests that economic performance and
4terrorism are linked along the lines discussed before. The ￿ndings of Collier and
Hoe› er (1998) indicate that higher levels of economic development coincide with
lower likelihoods of civil war, providing initial evidence that economic success
and con￿ ict are diametrically opposed. Considering economic development and
terrorism, several studies ￿nd that higher levels of development are obstacles to
the production of transnational terrorism (cf., e.g., Santos Bravo and Mendes
Dias, 2006; Lai, 2007; Freytag et al., 2008). Blomberg and Hess (2008) also ￿nd
that higher incomes are a strong deterrence to the genesis of domestic terrorism.
Furthermore, there is evidence connecting solid short-run economic conditions
with less political violence (cf. Muller and Weede, 1990; Freytag et al., 2008).6 In
general, the evidence indicates that terrorism and economic conditions are linked.
Here, economic success seems to impede the genesis of terrorism, presumably
due to higher opportunity costs of con￿ ict. In other words, in times of stronger
economic performance individuals simply have more to lose.
Research Contribution and Focus
Feasible theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence have been brought forward
considering the e⁄ects of terrorism on growth and of growth on terrorism. Still,
to the best of our knowledge no study has analyzed the causal nature of the
growth-terrorism nexus. Also, due to data constraints past evidence has focused
almost exclusively on transnational terrorism, although domestic terrorism is a
far more common phenomenon (cf. Enders and Sandler, 2008). With this contri-
bution we want to add to existing empirical evidence by providing a time-series
analysis of Granger causality between domestic terrorism and economic growth.
Here, multiple directions of causality are plausible. (i) Economic performance
may granger-cause terrorism, or (ii) terrorism may granger-cause performance.
On the one hand, terrorism a⁄ects the allocation and accumulation of resources.
On the other hand, economic performance may also impact the opportunity costs
of terror. (iii) If the two processes exist simultaneously, then feedback between
them is detected. Such a relationship may hint at the existence of a vicious cir-
cle of con￿ ict and economic decline, as previously discussed by Blomberg, Hess
and Thacker (2006). Lastly, (iv) a causal relationship between performance and
terror in the statistical sense may also be non-existent when there is no evidence
of substantial links.
In the next section, we test for Granger causality between domestic terrorism
and economic performance. As we are well aware that economic growth and
domestic terrorism may also be determined by other factors, we test for causality
in trivariate time-series settings which include a related control variable.7 As
a control, we choose trade openness, as this variable may interact with growth
as well as with terrorism. On the one hand, trade may impact growth, for
instance by inducing specialization and technology di⁄usion; increases in trade
openness may translate into higher economic growth (cf. Harrison, 1996). On
the other hand, trade may for instance be regarded as a threat by ￿ globalization
losers￿when jobs are lost, or as an opportunity by ￿ globalization winners￿when
trade increases wealth. Depending on which mechanism dominates, terrorism




We extract data on growth and terrorism for seven Western European countries.
Economic growth is measured by the rate of real GDP per capita growth in 2000
constant prices. Data for growth comes from the PENN World Table of Heston,
Summers and Aten (2006). Domestic terrorism is indicated by the total number
of individuals killed and wounded by acts of domestic terrorism in a given year
and country. That is, we use raw data on terrorist victims ￿on the intensity
of terror ￿rather than on terrorist attacks.9 We transform the series by taking
the natural logarithm and adding unity to allow for zero observations.10 Data
on domestic terrorism comes from the TWEED dataset as described by Engene
(2007).
We also test for growth-terrorism causality in a trivariate setting, using trade
openness as a control variable to reduce potential problems due to omitted vari-
ables. Trade openness is measured as the logarithm of the sum of exports and
imports divided by real GDP in 2000 constant prices. Data for openness also
comes from the PENN World Table.
Econometric Procedure
Below, we want to investigate the causal linkages between domestic terrorism
and economic growth. Methodologically, we proceed as follows. (i) We conduct
unit root tests to identify the order of integration of the investigated time series,
and to check for potential breaks in the series. (ii) As we need de-trended I(0)
time series to carry out the Granger causality analyses properly we then process
the data accordingly, building on unit root test results. (iii) We employ this
processed data when we execute a number of causality tests using the Hsiao-
Granger method. First, we test for causality in bivariate settings, where we
only consider the growth and terrorism series. Then, we also test for Granger
causality in a trivariate scenario to broaden the evidence and to evaluate the
robustness of our bivariate causality test results.
Unit Root Test
We ￿rst have to identify the order of integration of the investigated series. To
ensure a correct application of the causality test, all series need to be I(0), that
is, stationary and not exhibiting a unit root. The series cover long time spans.
Therefore, they may exhibit unexpected shifts ￿structural breaks ￿that are a
consequence of e.g. major structural changes in the economic or political realm.
Conventional unit root tests do not account for structural breaks and therefore
may produce biased results.
In order to account for possible breaks in the data, we use the unit root test (ZA
test) of Zivot and Andrews (1992) which allows for a structural break. Through
this test the investigated series are identi￿ed as I(1) ￿di⁄erence-stationary ￿or
I(0) with a break in the deterministic trend, that is, trend-stationary. We use
model C of the ZA test which allows for a break to occur in both intercept and
6trend. The test also gives the dates of the endogenously determined structural
breaks, thus further unveiling underlying dynamics.11
Table 1 gives the results of the ZA test for all investigated series. For growth
and terrorism, the unit root test always indicates that the series are I(0) with a
trend. For trade openness, the series are identi￿ed to be I(1) in six out of seven
cases. The calculated break dates ￿t in very well with economic and political
history. For instance, for Portugal, Spain and Greece most break dates coincide
with their transition to democracy. For the United Kingdom, the structural
break for the terror series matches the beginning of the Troubles in Northern
Ireland. For France, the break date for the economic growth series coincides
with the end of the Thirty Glorious Years of steady economic development. For
the other countries, similar observations can be made.12
￿Table 1 here ￿
Processing of Time-Series Data
Based on the results of the ZA test, we now process the time-series data in order
to obtain I(0) series. For six out of seven series on trade openness, the ZA test
indicates the existence of a unit root. Here, we achieve stationarity by simply
taking ￿rst di⁄erences.
When the ZA test does not indicate a unit root, the series is I(0) with a trend.
This is the case for one openness series and all growth and terror series. If so,
utilizing a di⁄erence ￿lter to obtain stationarity is neither necessary nor useful.
Instead, we de-trend the data following the method proposed by, inter alia,
Fernandez (1997). We run an OLS regression of the following form:
yt = ￿ + ￿t + ￿DUt + ￿Dt + ￿DTt + ^ yt: (1)
yt is the dependent variable representing the respective series for growth, terror
or openness. ￿ is a constant, t is a time trend, and DUt, Dt and DTt take
values depending on the calculated break date TB: DUt = 1 for t < TB, 0
otherwise; Dt = 1 for t = TB, 0 otherwise; DTt = (t ￿ TB) for t > TB, 0
otherwise. ^ yt is the residual from the OLS estimation. By using this approach,
we are able to eliminate trends and to take into account underlying structural
changes which may otherwise lead to biased results. We obtain the residuals




Tests for Granger causality are important tools in time-series analyses, for in-
stance as employed in Kollias, Naxakis and Zarangas (2004). A potential short-
coming of standard Granger causality analyses is that they may su⁄er from
arbitrary lag length selection because the considered time-series variables are
constrained to all enter at the same lag length. This may yield inconsistent
results due to model misspeci￿cations (cf. Braun and Mittnik, 1993). We hence
7rely on the sequential approach of Hsiao (1979, 1982) to test for Granger causal-
ity, which in particular circumvents problems associated with lag length selec-
tion. This procedure has been applied in e.g. Hsiao (1979, 1982) or Gries, Kraft
and Meierrieks (2008).
Granger￿ s (1969) de￿nition of non-causality states that if it is easier to predict a
series xt when including information from a series yt instead of only employing
lagged values of xt, then yt Granger-causes xt, denoted yt ) xt. Bidirectional
causality ￿or feedback ￿is present when xt also Granger-causes yt. By com-
bining this de￿nition of Granger causality with Akaike￿ s (1969) Final Prediction
Error (FPE), we can apply Hsiao￿ s approach toward testing for causality be-
tween the time series.
In its basic form, the causality testing procedure requires us to ￿rst consider an
autoregressive process:
y￿




t + ut: (2)
In Equation (2), the sigma sign in front of the lag operator (L) indicates the lag
order of the series running from 1 to m. ut is a white noise term with the usual
statistical properties and ￿ is a constant term. y￿
t is operationalized depending
on the previous ZA tests. If the series is I(0) with a trend, we employ the
residuals obtained from Equation (1), ^ yt. If the series is I(1), we use the usual
di⁄erence ￿lter where y￿
t is equal to yt￿1 ￿ yt in order to obtain stationarity.
We choose the lag order that yields the smallest FPE, denoted FPEy￿(m￿;0).
The individual FPE are calculated from the following equation with lags varying
from 1 to m:
FPEy￿(m;0) =
(T + m + 1)





Here, T is the number of observations and SSE is the residual sum of squares.
Then, we allow another variable x￿
t to enter our model, so we receive the subse-
quent vector autoregression model (VAR):
y￿








t + ut; (4)
x￿








t + vt: (5)
ut and vt are white noise terms with the usual statistical properties, and ￿ is
a constant. The sigma sign in front of the lag operator (L) indicates the lag
order of the series, where y￿
t and x￿
t again take values based on the previous
ZA tests. Either they represent the residuals obtained from Equation (1), or
they are di⁄erence-stationary series where the usual di⁄erence-￿lter has been
employed. Note that in both cases the series are now I(0), so the causality
testing procedure can be conducted properly. While y￿
t steadily enters Equation
(4) with the lag order from Equation (3) that yields the smallest FPE, m￿, x￿
t
8enters with a sequence of lags varying from 1 to n. The FPE of Equation (4) are
computed, with the speci￿c lag order being chosen that generates the smallest
FPE, denoted as FPEy￿(m￿;n￿), from:
FPEy￿(m￿;n) =
(T + m + n + 1)





By comparing the two minimal FPE, we can draw conclusions regarding causal-
ity. If FPEy￿(m￿;0) > FPEy￿(m￿;n￿), then x￿
t ) y￿
t, thus Granger causality is
established. If FPEy￿(m￿;0) < FPEy￿(m￿;n￿), then x￿
t 6) y￿
t and no Granger
causality is detected. Testing for Granger causality running from y￿
t to x￿
t re-
quires us to repeat the previously described steps this time with x￿
t being the
dependent variable, so we ultimately arrive at Equation (5).
Trivariate Causality Test
It is a well-known fact that causality tests in bivariate settings may produce in-
consistent results. L￿tkepohl (1982) shows that whether or not Granger causality
is detected in a bivariate speci￿cation may be due to omitted variables. In order
to reduce the possibility of omitted variables, we transform our bivariate model
into a trivariate one by including a control variable.
Methodologically, we build on the previously discussed procedure. We are now
interested in the causal relationship between the series yt and zt. Therefore, we
￿rst consider an autoregressive process as in Equation (2) and determine the
accordant minimal FPE as in Equation (3). Then, we consider a bivariate VAR
as in Equation (4), where the added variable xt now is the control variable,
namely trade openness. We calculate the minimal FPE as in Equation (5).
Next, we consider a trivariate VAR, where a new variable zt enters with lags
varying from 1 to p, while y￿
t and x￿
t enter the model with the lag order that
yields the smallest FPE, m￿and n￿.13 The corresponding FPE is computed, with
the speci￿c lag order being chosen that generates the smallest FPE, denoted as
FPEy￿(m￿;n￿;p￿), from the following equation with the known notation:
FPEy￿(m￿;n￿;p) =
(T + m + n + p + 1)





By comparing the two minimal FPE from the bivariate and trivariate VAR, we
can draw conclusions on causality. If FPEy￿(m￿;n￿;0) > FPEy￿(m￿;n￿;p￿),
then z￿
t ) y￿
t; Granger causality is established, conditional upon the presence
of xt. If FPEy￿(m￿;n￿;0) < FPEy￿(m￿;n￿;p￿), then z￿
t 6) y￿
t and no Granger
causality is detected. In order to test for causality from z￿
t to x￿
t, we would have
to repeat the procedure the other way around.
Bivariate Causality Test Results
Table 2 gives the results of the bivariate tests for causality running from terrorism
to real GDP per capita growth. Our results indicate that terrorism causally
sways economic growth only in the case of Portugal. For all other countries, we
do not detect a causal link. We may therefore assume that strong and developed
economies are able to endure terrorist violence without su⁄ering major negative
9growth e⁄ects. Rather, they seem to be able to absorb risk associated with
domestic terrorism. This is in line with Enders and Sandler (2008) who also
argue that economies that are, inter alia, diversi￿ed and exhibit well-developed
institutions are generally able to withstand the adverse macroeconomic e⁄ects
of terrorism.
In Table 2, we report our ￿ndings on causality running from growth to terrorism.
Here, economic growth always exerts a causal in￿ uence on terrorist violence.
That is, we can assume that economic growth a⁄ects the terrorists￿calculus by
having an impact on the opportunity costs of violence. Economic success allows
for more economic participation and opportunities, thus making violence more
costly. The contrary should hold for times of economic decline.
In general, for our sample we do not ￿nd strong support that economic growth
is a⁄ected by violence. Rather, targeted economies appear to be stable enough
to withstand the threat of domestic terrorism without su⁄ering major economic
setbacks.14 We ￿nd that growth unidirectionally causes domestic terrorist vio-
lence for six out of seven countries. For Portugal we ￿nd bidirectional Granger
causality. In the bivariate model speci￿cation, a strong link runs from economic
growth to terrorist violence, presumably as the opportunity costs of political
violence are impacted. This matches with previous empirical ￿ndings which
attribute a strong role to economic factors in shaping the patterns of con￿ ict
and terrorist violence (cf., e.g., Collier and Hoe› er, 1998; Blomberg, Hess and
Weerapana 2004; Blomberg and Hess, 2008; Freytag et al., 2008).
￿Table 2 here ￿
Trivariate Causality Test Results
We have already argued that care should be taken interpreting bivariate causal-
ity test results due to the possibility of misleading results. Table 2 has given an
initial hint that such caution could be appropriate for our analysis. The reported
joint F-statistics are not always signi￿cant, indicating that our causality infer-
ences may be spurious. To reduce potential bias due to omitted variables and to
raise the explanatory power of our analysis, we also test for Granger causality
between domestic terrorism and economic growth, conditional upon the presence
of trade openness. Earlier, we already outlined the underlying mechanisms. On
the one hand, trade may in￿ uence growth via increased specialization and so
forth. On the other hand, trade may also in￿ uence terrorist activity, mainly
by a⁄ecting the opportunity costs of violence. That is, from a theoretical point
of view there is the possibility that trade openness may drive growth as well
as terrorism. By accounting for trade openness in a trivariate system, we are
able to reduce inconsistent causality inferences which may have resulted from
the omission of trade openness in a bivariate model.15
Table 3 gives the results of the trivariate Granger causality tests running from
terrorism to real GDP per capita growth. The link from terrorism to growth
found in the bivariate system for Portugal is not detected in the trivariate case.
Concerning Germany and Spain, we interpret our results as in Triacca (1998),
also concluding that there is no causal relationship from terrorism to growth for
10these countries. In the bivariate system, we have already detected that there
is no Granger causality running from terrorist violence to economic growth; in
the trivariate system, the comparison between the two FPE now only seems
to suggest a causal e⁄ect from terror to growth. Following Triacca (1998), we
argue that it is actually trade openness ￿the omitted variable in the bivariate
system ￿that causes growth, and not terrorism.16 We therefore cannot state
that for Germany and Spain Granger causality runs from terrorist violence to
growth. To sum up, when including information on trade openness in a higher
dimensional process, we are hence unable to discover any statistical causality
e⁄ect of terrorism on economic growth. This con￿rms our earlier interpretation
that attacked economies have been successful in coping with the threats of do-
mestic terrorism. We attribute this resilience to the strength of the markets and
institutions of attacked economies (cf. Enders and Sandler, 2008).
With respect to the link from economic growth to terrorism, the results displayed
in Table 3 show that economic growth granger-causes terrorism now only in
the cases of Germany, Portugal and Spain. Note that for these cases the joint
F-statistics now always indicate signi￿cance, adding to the reliability of the
causality inferences. For France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom we
cannot con￿rm our causality ￿ndings from the bivariate speci￿cation. That is,
we still ￿nd some evidence for the idea that terrorism is impacted by growth
through the latter￿ s e⁄ect on the opportunity costs of violence. Conditional
upon the presence of information on trade openness, the in￿ uence of economic
performance on terrorism generally becomes less pronounced. Bivariate Granger
causality tests have at times been known to deliver inconsistent results; these
￿ndings should therefore be considered with caution.
In general, the Granger causality test results of the trivariate case only partially
con￿rm those of the bivariate analysis. On the one hand, the additional evidence
supports our idea that attacked economies have been successful in adjusting to
terrorist violence, thereby not incurring costs in the form of reduced growth.
We do not detect any Granger causality running from terrorism to growth in
trivariate systems. On the other hand, we should probably not overestimate the
determining e⁄ect of economic performance on terrorism, as we see related causal
relationships only for Germany, Portugal and Spain. This supports the evidence
provided by, inter alia, Freytag et al. (2008) on the e⁄ect of income growth on
terrorism. Still, the missing links for the other four countries of our sample also
support views that are more skeptical of the impact of economic performance
on terrorism (cf., e.g., Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen and Klemmensen 2006).
￿Table 3 here ￿
DISCUSSION
Policy Implications
The results of our Hsiao-Granger causality analysis indicate that economic fac-
tors ￿at least in some countries ￿played an important role in shaping terrorist
violence in Western Europe after the Second World War. In general, we provide
support for policies that aim at increasing the opportunity costs of terror as,
11for instance, advocated by Frey and Luechinger (2003). Apparently economic
success ￿especially in Germany, Portugal and Spain ￿helped to reduce polit-
ical violence by raising the opportunity costs of terrorism. Policies that focus
on growth and economic development are thus also potentially helpful in scaling
down terror risks. Related policies may yield additional dividends beyond raising
economic status, as social stability and peace may also be a⁄ected. For Western
Europe, developed welfare states may provide important institutional channels
for disseminating economic success, likewise explaining a link from economic per-
formance to domestic terrorism.17 Our results also imply that domestic terrorist
violence did not a⁄ect GDP per capita growth. A⁄ected economies seem to have
been generally successful in dealing with terror risks. Markets and institutions
appear to have adjusted e⁄ectively to terror risks.
In general, we argue that (i) policies that aim at improving economic status
should also be pursued because they may robustly reduce the propensity towards
domestic terrorism at least in some countries. The opportunity costs of violence
and the general in￿ uence of economic factors on terror should not be disregarded.
(ii) Policies that aim to increase the e¢ ciency of markets and institutions should
also be undertaken because they help to protect economies from the negative
e⁄ects of terrorism by increasing markets and institutions￿resiliency to terrorist
attacks.
Caveats
Several caveats can be brought forward with respect to our analysis. (i) Our
evidence is region-speci￿c, so the results may not hold for other world regions.
These regions may exhibit less developed markets and institutions, so they are
more prone to terror-induced shocks. Additionally, the relationship between
economic factors and terrorism may be less pronounced. For instance, the stud-
ies of Feldmann and Per￿l￿ (2004) for Latin America or of Piazza (2007) for
the Middle East suggest that other factors ￿for instance, political instability or
state failure ￿matter more strongly to terrorism in these parts of the world. (ii)
We only look at domestic terrorism. On the one hand, domestic terrorism is a
more common phenomenon than transnational terrorism, so we should be able to
thoroughly assess the interaction between terrorism and economic performance
with our data. On the other hand, transnational terrorism may also contribute
to this interaction, potentially amplifying the e⁄ects indicated by our analysis.18
(iii) With respect to our policy advice, we acknowledge that terrorism is caused
not only by economic factors. Economic success is not a panacea for terror. For
instance, political participation may also be helpful as it in￿ uences the oppor-
tunity costs of violence as well (cf. Frey and Luechinger, 2003). In particular,
this is true for con￿ ict that is also obviously co-determined by political factors
as e.g. in the case of ETA (cf. Barros, 2003).
SUMMARY
In this contribution, we tested for Granger causality between domestic terrorism
and real GDP per capita growth. Using the Hsiao-Granger method to detect
12causality in time series, we were able to circumvent common problems associated
with causality analyses in time-series frameworks. We tested for causality in a
bivariate and trivariate setting in order to provide robust results.
We found that (i) all investigated growth and terror series exhibit structural
breaks matching major turning points in the countries￿economic and political
history. (ii) In bivariate systems, economic growth leads terrorist violence in all
cases, whereas terrorism causally in￿ uences growth only for one country. We
argued that economic performance appears to in￿ uence the terrorists￿calculus,
while attacked economies are generally resistant to domestic terrorism. (iii) We
noted that bivariate causality tests may be prone to inconsistencies, so we also
performed causality tests in trivariate systems. The ￿ndings con￿rmed that
economies under attack are successful in adjusting to the threats of terror, so
economic growth is not impaired. With respect to causality running from growth
to terrorism, the results weaken those of the bivariate analysis. Economic per-
formance robustly sways the terrorists￿calculus only for Germany, Portugal and
Spain, but not for France, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. Solid growth
in some countries may raise the opportunity costs of terror, thus discouraging
violent behavior, for instance as individuals ￿nd more economic opportunities.
In the light of our results, policymakers therefore should not underestimate the
role of economic factors ￿and the role of the opportunity costs of violence ￿in
impacting domestic terrorism. For some countries in the investigated part of the
world, economic success apparently has contributed to a crowding out of domes-
tic terrorist violence. However, factors other than economic performance should
also be considered when explaining terrorism dynamics, in particular when the
links between economic growth and domestic terrorist violence are not found to
be strong.
13Notes
1For our analysis we focus on domestic terrorism, that is, terrorism involving only citizens,
groups or the territory of one country. In contrast, transnational terrorism means terrorism
involving citizens, groups or the territory of more than one country. Here, either the sources
or targets of transnational terrorism can be analyzed.
2The countries of the analysis with their time horizons are: France (1951-2004), Germany
(1971-2004), Greece (1952-2004), Italy (1951-2004), Portugal (1951-2004), Spain (1951-2004)
and the United Kingdom (1951-2004). No information on Germany is available before 1970;
data prior to 1990 relates only to West Germany. The information on the United Kingdom
also includes Northern Ireland.
3The TWEED dataset provides information on domestic terrorism for 18 Western European
countries.
4Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2007) and Enders and Sandler (2008) bring forward similar
theoretical channels of in￿uence of terrorism on the economy. These studies also provide
additional evidence on the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism that is not reported
here.
5The empirical evidence reported in the following almost always refers to the phenomenon
of transnational terrorism, given the lack of data on domestic terrorism in the past (cf. Enders
and Sandler, 2008). Although we do not believe that transnational and domestic terrorism
interact symmetrically with the economy, we report ￿tting evidence to show (i) that terrorism
may damage the economy and (ii) economic factors may determine terrorist activity.
6Evidence on the targets of transnational terrorism either ￿nds that short-run and long-run
economic conditions do not matter strongly for terrorists￿attack decisions (cf. Piazza, 2006;
Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen and Klemmensen, 2006), or indicate that
economically successful countries are more prone to terrorism (cf. Tavares, 2004; Blomberg,
Hess and Weerapana 2004). Attackers from abroad may not be deterred by increased economic
opportunities in the country they attack. Instead, economic success may increase the payo⁄s
from terrorist strikes. That is, the cost-bene￿t considerations of transnational attackers may
di⁄er from those of domestic terrorists.
7Economic growth may also be driven by, inter alia, geography, trade or institutions. Ter-
rorism may be determined by e.g. other material causes, political factors, demography or
systemic reasons.
8Mirza and Verdier (2008) provide an overview of the terrorism-trade literature, focusing
on transnational terrorism. It is reasonable to believe that at least some related ￿ndings can
be transferred to the relationship between domestic terrorism and trade. Note that in the
broader sense trade openness may also re￿ect the general quality of institutions (cf. Rodrik,
2000). Better institutional quality should coincide with less terrorist activity.
9When we use data on terrorist attack counts, we cannot possibly evaluate the ferocity
of such attacks. For instance, both a minor, politically motivated damage to property and a
severe bombing with multiple casualties count as one attack; here, it appears reasonable to
assume that there is a much stronger interaction between the bombing and economic factors.
10We use the natural logarithm to better account for outliers. We add unity to the observa-
tions in order to compute the natural logarithm also in those years when there were no victims
from terrorist attacks.
11Note that when two or more series used simultaneously in the following causality analysis
are found to be I(1), further tests for cointegration would be required in order to account for
long-run equilibrium relationships between the series. As cointegration plays no role in our
analysis, we do not discuss this point any further.
12We also use the unit root test of Clemente, MontaæØs and Reyes (1998) which allows for
two structural breaks. These results generally con￿rm our results on stationarity and structural
break dates.
13The trivariate VAR is not presented due to space constraints.
14We are well aware that terrorism may damage certain sectors of the economy, and we
hinted at corresponding evidence in our literature review. Our analysis simply provides little
evidence that such damages feed through to overall growth.
15One can argue that other factors potentially driving growth as well as terrorism should
also be controlled for, such as the quality of economic institutions, political instability and
transformation, or human capital endowment. We opt for trade openness because it matches
14with our analysis on thereotical grounds and because data is available for all countries and
time periods.
16Triacca (1998) provides proof for the following argument: If a variable Y3 does not cause
Y1 in a bivariate system, but in a trivariate one where the variable Y2 is also included, then
Y2 must cause Y1 in the bivariate and trivariate system. We apply his proof to our causality
evidence for Germany and Spain, where Y1 is economic growth, Y2 is trade openness and Y3
is terrorist violence.
17See Burgoon (2006) for an in-depth discussion of the potential links between terrorism
and welfare policies.
18However, clearly di⁄erentiating between domestic and transnational terrorism ￿as in our
analysis ￿may be helpful to keep apart potentially di⁄erent terrorists￿calculi. As discussed
before, transnational terrorists may be driven by other cost-bene￿t considerations than do-
mestic terrorists. For instance, while transnational terrorists may ￿nd it attractive to attack
rich countries because of the increased bene￿ts of such attacks, domestic terrorists may reduce
attacks at the same time due to the increased opportunity costs of violence.
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18Table 1: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test
Country Series ZA Statistics Break Date Inference
France Growth (G) -6.722a 1974 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.636a 1989 I(0) + Trend
Openness -3.787 1982 I(1)
Germany Growth (G) -5.113b 1988 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -6.614a 1995 I(0) + Trend
Openness -3.904 1993 I(1)
Greece Growth (G) -10.006a 1974 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.934a 1985 I(0) + Trend
Openness -5.025 1973 I(1)
Italy Growth (G) -7.233a 1963 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.400b 1971 I(0) + Trend
Openness -2.917 1973 I(1)
Portugal Growth (G) -6.792a 1974 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -6.513a 1975 I(0) + Trend
Openness -5.125b 1974 I(0) + Trend
Spain Growth (G) -7.754a 1975 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -6.385a 1971 I(0) + Trend
Openness -4.606 1959 I(1)
UK Growth (G) -6.147a 1983 I(0) + Trend
Terrorism (T) -5.130b 1969 I(0) + Trend
Openness -3.593 1981 I(1)
Notes: (b), (a) indicates signi￿cance of the Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test at 5% and
1% levels, that is, rejection of the hypothesis of unit root presence. Critical values are
taken from Zivot and Andrews (1992).
19Table 2: Terrorism-Growth Bivariate Causality Test
Country FPE FPE F-Stat T ) G FPE FPE F-Stat G ) T
(m,0) (m,n) (m,0) (m,n)
France 2.1184 2.3718 0.236 NO 1.8558 1.7156 1.453 YES
(1,0) (1,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Germany 2.0725 2.4928 2.651
b NO 0.8187 0.6665 3.268
b YES
(4,0) (4,2) (1,0) (1,2)
Greece 6.8433 7.0927 1.254 NO 0.5640 0.5287 0.349 YES
(1,0) (1,5) (1,0) (1,1)
Italy 4.0109 4.0169 0.128 NO 1.4802 1.3581 0.630 YES
(1,0) (1,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Portugal 9.2646 8.5833 0.917 YES 0.2965 0.2655 3.102
a YES
(1,0) (1,1) (5,0) (5,3)
Spain 6.5819 8.5833 0.917 NO 0.5009 0.2798 2.753
b YES
(1,0) (1,1) (6,0) (6,3)
UK 3.2292 3.4394 1.404 NO 1.1821 1.1774 1.112 YES
(2,0) (2,1) (1,0) (1,1)
Notes: FPE (m,0) indicates the minimal FPE of autoregressive process with the
optimal lag length m
￿. FPE (m,n) indicates the minimal FPE of the two variable
VAR process with the optimal lag lengths m
￿ and n
￿. We allow for a maximum of
six lags. (b) and (a) denote signi￿cance of the joint F-statistics at 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
20Table 3: Terrorism-Growth Trivariate Causality Test
Country FPE FPE F-Stat T ) G FPE FPE F-Stat G ) T
(m,n,0) (m,n,p) (m,n,0) (m,n,p)
France 2.3739 2.4408 0.661 NO 1.7136 1.7778 1.338 NO
(1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Germany 2.5289 2.4753 2.61
b NO
+ 0.6335 0.5894 4.23
a YES
(4,1,0) (4,1,2) (1,1,0) (1,1,2)
Greece 7.1225 7.1755 1.262 NO 0.5345 0.5556 0.378 NO
(1,1,0) (1,1,5) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Italy 4.0602 4.1992 0.106 NO 1.4085 1.4303 0.516 NO
(1,1,0) (1,1,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Portugal 8.6179 8.7752 0.868 NO 0.2966 0.2692 2.892
b YES
(1,1,0) (1,1,1) (5,1,0) (5,1,3)
Spain 6.2268 5.9240 3.093
b NO
+ 0.5113 0.4809 2.193
b YES
(1,3,0) (1,3,1) (6,1,0) (6,1,6)
UK 3.1570 3.2664 2.095
c NO 1.1727 1.2052 0.872 NO
(2,2,0) (2,2,1) (1,1,0) (1,1,1)
Notes: FPE (m,n,0) indicates the minimal FPE of the bivariate VAR with the optimal
lag lengths m
￿ and n
￿. FPE (m,n,p) indicates the minimal FPE of the trivariate VAR
with the optimal lag lengths m
￿, n
￿ and p
￿. We allow for a maximum of six lags.
(c) (b) and (a) denote signi￿cance of the joint F-statistics at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. (+) indicates that causality is driven by the control variable. See the
text for a further discussion.
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